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Patrick S. Shin* 
Mitu Gulati** 
Twenty-five years ago, law schools were in the developing stages of a 
pitched battle for the future of legal education and academia. Faculties 
fought over the tenure cases of minority candidates, revealing deep divisions 
within legal academia on questions about the urgency of racial 
diversification and the merits of critical race scholarship. The students in 
charge of the law reviews where this scholarship was emerging engaged in 
their own battles, arguing over the use of affirmative action in the selection 
of law review editors and then, as neophyte editors, staking their own 
positions in the “What is legal scholarship?” debates. As students during this 
period, we could not avoid reflecting on our own attitudes toward the 
relevance of race in the legal profession and on the value of legal scholarship 
about race. 
Looking back at that time from the perspective of our current positions, 
we are renewed in our admiration of and appreciation for Professor 
Matsuda’s scholarship. She was a central figure in the then-emergent critical 
race movement, and her work was a focus in discussions about the field.1 
Through her fearless and unwavering writings, Matsuda helped spur changes 
in attitude and perspective within legal academia that prepared the way for 
other scholars of color. Equal to her impact within the academy was the 
inspiration she provided to a generation of prospective Asian American legal 
scholars. In her example, we saw the possibility that our voices might be 
heard inside the enclave of legal academia. 
The idea that established communities have strong reasons to attach 
value to the voices and perspectives of outsiders is a theme that runs through 
much of Matsuda’s scholarship. In this Essay, we examine Matsuda’s 
application of this idea in two articles on affirmative action: an influential 
early piece, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in 
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Plowed-Up Ground,2 and one written fifteen years later, Who Is Excellent?3 
We offer some reflections on the ways in which Matsuda’s arguments relate 
to current thinking about affirmative action and the value of diversity. 
What strikes us as distinctive about Matsuda’s arguments for affirmative 
action in Planting Seeds and Who Is Excellent? is that they are not primarily 
framed as arguments derived from principles of justice or equality. Although 
Matsuda elsewhere suggests that affirmative action might be justified as a 
form of reparations,4 she does not make that her argument in these two 
pieces. Rather, in Planting Seeds, Matsuda argues in favor of affirmative 
efforts to recognize and validate minority scholarship as a means of 
increasing the scope, robustness, and reach of legal knowledge.5 In Who Is 
Excellent?, she argues for affirmative action in university admissions as a way 
to foster “deep learning”6 and “critical thinking.”7 According to the view that 
Matsuda articulates, affirmative action in legal academia and in legal 
education is not a matter of giving minorities a leg up for the sake of 
achieving broad goals of social justice or racial equality. While she does not 
deny that these goals may also be served, in Planting Seeds and Who Is 
Excellent?, she seeks to justify affirmative action in legal academia and 
education not in terms of these external social goals but in terms of internal 
values that fundamentally define those institutions. She presents affirmative 
action as a natural extension of our commitment to open inquiry and critical 
thinking that will benefit academia and education on their own terms, 
regardless of any associated positive benefits for society as a whole. 
In the arena of scholarship, affirmative action, according to Matsuda, 
means constructive engagement with the work of outsiders that might not be 
deemed worthy of notice under traditional filters.8 Matsuda’s reason for 
extending our engagement in this way is rooted in the very nature of the 
scholarly enterprise. We should engage with unfamiliar scholarship because 
this will increase our legal knowledge. And we must care about increasing 
knowledge if we care about scholarship at all, because that is just what 
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scholarship is. Similarly, for educators, affirmative action is about opening 
the learning community to outsider perspectives. The reason for doing so is 
that this will enrich discourse and challenge students to think critically about 
conventional assumptions.9 And we must care about pushing our students in 
this way insofar as we care about educating them at all, because that is just 
what education is. Thus, on Matsuda’s view, affirmative action serves values 
that are constitutive of the institutions of legal scholarship and education.10 
Matsuda’s early writing about affirmative action may seem at first to 
resonate with the now-standard view that affirmative action can be justified 
by a compelling interest in diverse communities of higher learning and 
discourse. When we read more carefully, however, we notice that the words 
“diversity” and “diverse” never appear in Planting Seeds. Matsuda there 
expresses little interest in racial or other demographics as such. Rather, her 
concern is more directly rooted in ideals of intellectual empathy. She strives 
for a community in which “the perspective of outsiders is considered as a 
matter of course . . . and is expressed freely without fear of being labeled 
irrelevant or unrealistic.”11 Matsuda’s hope in Planting Seeds is that through 
affirmative action, “we will live and work a different kind of academic life.”12 
This is not just a matter of increasing the representation of racial minorities 
in the academic community but is, as she puts it, a commitment that 
requires active development of our “social skill at integrated life.”13 
In Who Is Excellent?, which was written around the time of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Grutter,14 Matsuda does identify the importance of 
increasing the diversity of student bodies as a reason for affirmative action.15 
But even here, it is clear that she is not merely advocating for the admission 
of racial minorities in higher numbers. She agrees with critics of racial 
identity politics in rejecting “identity grouping as an end in itself”16 but 
thinks of the experience of racial identity as one source of different 
understandings of the world. Again, Matsuda’s goal is more than changing 
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the racial demographic of our students. Her interest in affirmative action 
reflects, instead, a particular approach to the question, “What will we teach 
them?”17 Matsuda’s answer is that by seriously considering outsider 
perspectives, we can take students “to the place of unheard of ideas.”18 
Re-reading Matsuda’s original account of affirmative action naturally 
invites comparison with our modern understandings. Arguably, affirmative 
action as envisioned in Matsuda’s writings is quite different from how we 
tend to think of it today. In Planting Seeds and Who Is Excellent?, affirmative 
action in academia and higher education is portrayed as a form of active 
intellectual engagement with outsider perspectives, justified by the value of 
knowledge and critical thinking. In contrast, according to the familiar post-
Grutter rationale, affirmative action is a decisionmaking procedure that 
permits the consideration of race in admissions or hiring decisions, justified 
by various benefits that flow from the resultant diversity. Some of these 
benefits, such as enhanced classroom discourse, are consistent with 
Matsuda’s goals for affirmative action. But the diversity rationale tells a 
different story about how these beneficial consequences are achieved. 
According to the diversity rationale articulated in Grutter, once a 
community achieves a certain level of racial diversity (“critical mass”), a 
bundle of benefits opens.19 Discourse is enriched, stereotype-based thinking 
is reduced, conscious and unconscious biases are eased, and cross-racial and 
-cultural understandings are improved.20 But it seems that we think of the 
activation of these benefits as a mostly passive affair, a matter of social 
science. The benefits of diversity materialize through the natural operation 
of psychological mechanisms that accompany social contact. The 
contemporary view seems to be that the purpose of affirmative action is to 
manufacture diversity and then diversity itself takes care of the rest. On 
Matsuda’s view in Planting Seeds and Who Is Excellent?, the work of 
affirmative action is not limited to the moment of inclusion but instead 
requires continuing efforts to incorporate new perspectives into our 
scholarship and teaching. Affirmative action requires engagement after the 
moment of inclusion. On the social science view, we tend to assume that 
once we achieve sufficient heterogeneity in our community—which is no 
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 19. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325, 329–30. The theory of “critical mass,” we suspect, is 
intuitively plausible to many. But the empirical case is still a matter of considerable debate. See, 
e.g., Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Does Critical Mass Matter? 
Views from the Boardroom, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049 (2011). 
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easy task, to be sure—diversity itself will then take over the work of social 
integration. On Matsuda’s view, affirmative action consists in striving for the 
“skill” of integration, not just creating the conditions from which integrative 
benefits passively materialize. 
The idea that diversity, once created, naturally yields socially beneficial 
consequences has made affirmative action a highly user-friendly proposition. 
This is not to minimize the level of principled commitment and political 
resolve necessary to put an affirmative action policy or diversity initiative in 
place. But there is a certain convenience in the notion that the integrative, 
discourse-enriching benefits of diversity will be realized simply by virtue of 
its mere existence. We do not doubt the science supporting the social contact 
hypothesis, i.e., the notion that exposure to and contact with members of 
out-groups can lead to reduced bias and stereotyping.21 What we wonder, 
though, is whether the diversity rationale has given rise to a tendency to 
conflate the production of racial diversity with an intellectual commitment 
to open inquiry and critical thinking—affirmative action in Matsuda’s sense. 
The introduction of diversity may very well cause a reduction of 
discriminatory attitudes that might be necessary for engaging with 
unfamiliar ideas, but it may not be sufficient. Freedom from bias and 
stereotypes is not the same thing as being intellectually open to outsider 
perspectives, pursuing nontraditional modes of argument, or engaging in 
critical thought. We wonder whether our fascination with diversity as a 
mechanism for reducing bias has led us to think of diversity as a substitute 
for the kind of intellectual engagement that Matsuda advocated in Who Is 
Excellent? and Planting Seeds.  
A community can be racially diverse in the sense of being formally 
inclusive of minorities and yet still demand a high level of conformity in the 
more performative aspects of identity.22 Demographically diverse 
institutions can still place significantly disparate burdens on individuals to 
act in ways that support and reaffirm prevailing norms of appropriate, 
normal, professional conduct and expression. A community can have a high 
degree of racial diversity and still have a narrow mindset in judging “who is 
excellent.” Perhaps in some contexts this narrowness is inescapable. Law 
schools must think about whether an applicant will be able to pass the bar; 
corporate firms must take into account project and client needs; faculties 
must consider publication records. Our interest is not in finding fault. 
Rather, our point is that the presence of demographic racial diversity implies 
 
 21. See Katharine Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of 
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1953–56 
(2009); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2006). 
 22. See generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING 
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very little about the extent of genuine pluralism in a community’s cultural, 
intellectual, and performative norms.23 
A further problem is that diversity is a vague and amorphous concept. It 
is hard to pin down what diversity exactly is.24 This makes it difficult to 
distinguish institutions that are genuinely committed to diversity from those 
that are merely good at talking the talk for the sake of goodwill. Additionally, 
the vagueness of diversity, when combined with its dissociability from 
particular substantive motives, gives rise to the possibility that the 
promotion of diversity might be misused as cover for political agendas or to 
mask ulterior interests.25 Whatever one might say about the applicability of 
the social contact hypothesis in that kind of scenario,26 the production of 
diversity under such circumstances would be a far cry from Matsuda’s vision 
of affirmative action. 
While we worry that current proponents of affirmative action expect the 
production of diversity to do too much work for us as we move toward the 
ideal of a more inclusive society, we do not advocate that the diversity 
rationale be abandoned. For one thing, racial diversity is one important 
answer to Matsuda’s question, “What is the best mix of people to spark the 
interactions from which deep learning emerges?”27 Diversity of race is 
arguably a crucial aspect of the best mix. For another thing, one might argue 
that the psychological mechanisms by which diversity reduces 
discrimination have nothing to do with the motives by which that diversity is 
created.28 So, even if institutions engage in diversity initiatives for reasons 
that are disconnected from the original ideals behind affirmative action, 
those initiatives may still be a good thing insofar as they contribute to the 
reduction of discriminatory attitudes. 
The diversity rationale is different from Matsuda’s argument for 
affirmative action. She saw affirmative action as serving values that are 
 
 23. And the fact that an institution claims a commitment to diversity implies even less. 
Cf. Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017 (2011). 
 24. See id. at 1027–29. 
 25. Cf. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 570 n.46 (1984) (expressing skepticism about the efficacy 
and signification of diversity-based affirmative action in admissions). 
 26. Social scientists have found that four key conditions are necessary in order for 
intergroup contact to reduce discriminatory stereotypes: “equal status between the groups, 
common goals, the interdependence of the groups, and the positive support of authorities, 
laws, or custom.” Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1953–54 (discussing research confirming the 
original findings of Gordon Allport, who first articulated the social contact hypothesis in 
GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 281 (1954)). 
 27. Who Is Excellent?, supra note 3, at 32. 
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constitutive of academic institutions. In contrast, the diversity rationale 
seeks to justify affirmative action in terms of the broader social purpose of 
reducing racial discrimination and inequality. This is, of course, a 
compelling goal, and we agree that the creation of diversity in various 
institutional settings is an important means to achieving it. Thus, we support 
the diversity rationale for affirmative action. But we think that the creation 
of racial diversity should be understood as but one step toward the ideal of 
an inclusive community. Planting Seeds and Who Is Excellent? teach us that 
affirmative action is not a policy that we can just put in place and then 
passively reap the benefits. If we are not careful in first being clear as to what 
benefits we are hoping to obtain from diversity and then working to ensure 
that our diversity initiatives actually produce those benefits, we will end up 
wasting resources that might be better spent elsewhere. Affirmative action is 
hard work, and it is hard work that continues after the moment of inclusion. 
The planting of seeds is a vivid metaphor, but, ironically, what Matsuda tells 
us is that the heart of affirmative action is not in the planting. It is in the skill 
required for successful cultivation. 
 
